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Florida Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [1955], Art. 2

RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN FLORIDA
RcHAD H. HUNT*
HIsToRICAL BACKGROUND

By treaty of February 22, 1819, the Kingdom of Spain ceded "to
the United States, in full property and sovereignty, all the territories
known by the name of East and West Florida," with an express
...
provision that all the grants of land made by Spain before January
24, 1818, should be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession
of the lands., In 1845 the Territory of East and West Florida was
admitted to the Union as the State of Florida, on equal footing with
the original states.2
Under the common law of England the Crown in its sovereign
capacity held title to the beds of navigable or tide waters, including
the space between high and low water marks, in trust for the people
of the realm, who had rights of navigation, commerce, fishing, bathing,
and other easements allowed by law. After the American Revolution
neither proprietary rights in tidal lands within the states nor power
to dispose of such lands was delegated to the federal government by
the Constitution. All proprietary rights in shores and lands under
navigable waters were therefore reserved to the states severally.3 Thus
Florida acquired the rights, prerogatives, and duties with respect to
navigable waters and underlying lands within its boundaries that
were held by the original thirteen states, except to the extent of their
modification by the cession treaty with Spain. 4
According to the laws of Spain, the rights of a subject in lands
bounded by navigable waters were derived from the Crown and extended only to the high-water mark unless otherwise specified by
an express grant. Although the Spanish possessions in America were
held by the Crown to be alienable at will, a grant or concession of
lands under navigable waters and tidelands was not in accord with
*Circuit Judge, Eleventh Circuit of Florida, 1940-46; President, The Florida Bar,
1948-49; Member of Miami, Florida, Bar.
,Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, 8 STAT. 252 (1819).
2Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1819); see State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 610, 47 So. 353, 355 (1908).
3State ex teL Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908).
4Cases cited note 2 supra.
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custom. Such lands and waters were held for the public use, and a
conveyance of them to private ownership could be consummated only
by a clear showing of sovereign intent.5 Even private ownership
would not preclude public use of the lands and waters unless the lands
were reclaimed and improved for special purposes under Grown
grants. 6
Except for Spanish grants of submerged lands made prior to
January 24, 1818, Florida applies an admixture of common law and
statutory principles in determining riparian rights of its inhabitants.
NAVIGABLE WATERS

Determination of Navigability
Since riparian rights on nonnavigable and navigable waters differ,
navigability must be defined. In the majority of jurisdictions navi7
gable waters are defined as those that are navigable in point of fact.

Navigability in fact means susceptibility to use under normal conditions as highways of commerce over which trade and travel by
water may be conducted in at least one of the customary modes.8
The fact that the waters are tidal is immaterial," as is the fact that
the entire body, or any portion thereof, is not susceptible of use
throughout the entire year.O The navigability of a particular aqueous
5Jover y Costas v. Insular Gov't of Philippine Islands, 221 U.S. 623 (1911);
Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923).
6Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923).
,Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
430 (1874); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); Bayzer v. McMillan
Mill Co., 105 Ala. 395, 16 So. 923 (1895); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So.
826 (1909); Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905); People v. System
Properties, 189 Misc. 991, 76 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
8United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); Economy Light & Power Co. v.
United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); Blackman v. Maudlin, 164 Ala. 337, 51 So. 23
(1909); Asselin v. Blount, 65 R.I. 293, 14 A.2d 696 (1940); Taylor Fishing Club

v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Ewell v. Lambert, 177 Va. 222,
13 S.E.2d 333 (1941).
9The Daniel Ball, supra note 7; The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443 (1851); Miami Beach Jockey Club v. Dern, 83 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1936);
Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927); Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109,
58 So. 25 (1912); Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 197
S.E. 714 (1938).
lOUnited States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Hallock v.
Suitor, 37 Ore. 9, 60 Pac. 384 (1900).
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body can be determined only by scrutinizing all the facts pertaining
thereto.11
12
In a case involving the Suwannee River above White Springs,
the Florida Supreme Court held that a navigable stream is a public
highway open to all persons for the business of any floatage to which
it is adapted, and that even though a stream is so shallow as to be
suitable only for the floating of logs and rafts it nevertheless will
be regarded as a public stream and hence navigable in fact. The Court
further held it unessential to navigability that a stream be continuously
suited to floatage at all seasons of the year. This decision revised the
moss-covered concept that a stream is not navigable unless it contains
sufficient depth to float vessels.
Twenty years later the Supreme Court expanded its "limited use"
theory of navigability in a decision involving Lake Jackson in Leon
County. 3 The lower court held that a United States patent of 1827
vested title to the bed of the lake in private ownership. The Supreme
Court, however, held that Lake Jackson had the characteristics of
navigability requisite to state ownership, even though most of the
lake area at ordinary level could be navigated only by flat-bottomed
boats drawing from three to six inches of water and at ordinary low
water large portions of the bottom of the lac e became exposed and
dried out to such an extent that crops were planted and harvested
on the bed. The Court took into consideration the fact that the waters
were of considerable area and useful for general navigation in small
boats. It stated that whether the lake had been used for commercial
purposes in the past was immaterial in view of the fact that, by its
nature, such uses could be made in the future. The fact that the lake
went dry at times was disregarded, since in its ordinary state it was
navigable.
Navigable waters in Florida include all lakes, rivers, bays, harbors,
4
or other waters capable of practical navigation for useful purposes.'
In order that a body of water be considered navigable and therefore
free for public use, it must, in its natural state, be capable of sustaining
navigation without the necessity of any improvement or artificial aid.
A stream is not necessarily subject to free public use merely because it
"United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Bucki
v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160 (1889).
12Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160 (1889).
'SBroward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
14Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
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has been rendered navigable by artificial means. 15
Common Law Rights
Once a body of water has been found to be navigable in the legal
sense of the term, the Florida lawyer faces a dearth of decisions resolving common law rights incident to the ownership of contiguous
lands. The Florida Supreme Court in two decisions, however, has
defined the rights of a riparian owner in relation to navigable waters.
In Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n' 6 a riparian owner sought to enjoin the
defendant from depriving it of access to the river front adjacent to
its land and asked enforcement of an asserted exclusive right to use
the waters and shore contiguous to its land. Both plaintiff and defendant were engaged in the logging business. The lower court
dismissed the plaintiff's bill on demurrer. The Supreme Court, in
reversing the lower court, held that under the allegations of the complaint the plaintiff was entitled to relief against total exclusion from
access to the water, but that no exclusive right to the use of the waters
and shore existed. On this point the Court, through Chief Justice
1
Whitfield, stated: 7
"As to mere navigation in commerce upon the public waters,
riparian owners as such have no rights superior to other inhabitants of the State. A riparian owner may use the navigable
waters and the lands thereunder opposite his land for purposes
of navigation and of conducting commerce or business thereon,
but such right is only concurrent with that of other inhabitants
of the State and must be exercised subject to the rights of
others.... The right of access to the waters from the riparian
lands may in general be exclusive in the owner of such lands,
but as to the use of the navigable waters and the lands thereunder including the shore, the rights of riparian owners and of
others of the public are concurrent, and subject to applicable
rules of law. A riparian owner has a right to enjoin in a proper
proceeding the unlawful use of the public waters or the land
thereunder including the shore which is a part of the bed, when
15Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
1657 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909).

17d. at 404, 48 So. at 645.
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such unlawful use operates as a special injury to such riparian
owner in the use and enjoyment of his riparian lands.... In
the absence of a valid statute providing otherwise, the injury
must relate to riparian lands or business conducted thereon
and not to business conducted on the waters by virtue only of
the right of navigation."
The Court pointed out that if a person obstructs the mere right of
navigation and does no special injury to riparian property, a complainant must seek his remedy through the proper public officials."'
In Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. 1 9 the Court pointed out that
riparian rights are property rights and that the riparian owner cannot
be deprived of them without compensation. In that case the defendant railway had acquired title from the City of Pensacola to
certain submerged lands contiguous to the plaintiff's land. The city
had obtained the property from the state. After acquiring title the
railway filled in the submerged lands and built docks, wharves, and
other instrumentalities of commerce. The plaintiff, as a riparian
owner, sought damages predicated upon an infringement of his
rights of access and unobstructed view of the waters. Upon rehearing
the Supreme Court, in reversing its own decision as well as that of
the lower court, recognized that the plaintiff had validly asserted
20
common law riparian rights independent of statute:
"Riparian rights we think are property, and being so the
right to take it for public use without compensation does not
exist. The fronting of a lot upon a navigable stream or bay
often constitutes its chief value and desirability whether for
residence or business purposes. The right of access to the
property over the water, the unobstructed view of the bay and
the enjoyment of the privileges of the waters incident to ownership of the bordering land would not in many cases be exchanged for the price of an inland lot in the same vicinity. In
many cases doubtless the riparian rights incident to the ownership of the land were the principal if not sole inducement leading to its purchase by one and the reason for the price charged
by the seller."
181d. at 406, 48 So. at 646.
1975 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918).

201d. at 78, 78 So. at 507.
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Legislative Revision of the Common Law
a. Act of 1856
Undoubtedly impelled by the commercial potentialities of the
state's 1398-mile coastline,21 its 30,000 lakes and ponds,-2 2 and its
countless miles of uplands and tidelands bordering navigable waters,
the Florida Legislature in 1856 enacted chapter 791, entitled "An
Act to Benefit Commerce." 23 This act vested full title to riparian
shallows in the riparian proprietors in order that they might fill in
the shoreline and erect warehouses and wharves. The owners could
prevent encroachments by appropriate legal action, including the
right to maintain the action of trespass.
It appears at first glance that the Legislature by this act vested
an absolute title in the riparian owners. Subsequent litigation, how25
ever, proved otherwise.24 In State v. Black River Phosphate Co.
the state sought to enjoin a riparian owner from taking phosphate
deposits from the bed of a navigable river. The defendant claimed
title to the phosphate under the Riparian Act of 1856. The Court
held that the statute did not give to the riparian owner the right
to take phosphates from the beds of navigable streams. It stated
that the 1856 act had the distinct public purpose of connecting the
shore and banks of bays, harbors, and streams with the channel and
navigable waters and that, instead of being an absolute and unqualified gift of the land intervening between the shore and channel, it
was, so long as the water was not converted into land by filling in,
a mere grant for a particular and specially defined use.
b. Act of 1921
The Riparian Act of 1856 was limited to lands owned by the
United States or its citizens and affected only land between the channel
and the low-water mark on navigable streams, bays, and harbors.
In 1921 the Legislature extended the act of 1856.26 This act, com2lWoRLD ALMANAC

102 (1949).

22MoRRIs, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 70 (3d ed. 1952).
23FLA. GEN. LAWS c. 791, §2 (1856).
24

Panama Ice & Fish Co. v. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 71 Fla. 419, 71 So. 608 (1916);
State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893).
2532 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893).
26Fla. Laws 1921, c. 8537, now FLA. STAT. c. 271 (1953).
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monly known as the Butler Bill, vested in the riparian owners on
navigable streams the title to submerged lands from the edge of
the channel to the high-water mark, with a provision that the grant
should apply to only those submerged lands "which have been, or
may be hereafter, actually bulkheaded or filled in or permanently
improved, and shall in no wise affect such submerged lands until
2
actually filled in or permanently improved." 7
Specifically excluded from the grant of the 1921 act, inter alia, were
swamp and overflowed lands, lakes other than tidewater, and public
bathing beaches. For curative reasons the act was designed to take
effect retroactively to the date of passage of the 1856 act.
It has been held that a riparian owner who fills and bulkheads
submerged contiguous lands matures a provisional grant into an
absolute title and that he cannot be divested of his title even by a
subsequent act of the Legislature. 28 After an upland owner bulkheads and fills in land within the requirements of the 1921 act, "the
title to the filled in land becomes absolute and equal to that of the upland."29
The leading case of Holland v. Fort Pierce Financing& Construction Co.30 dealt with an attempt of the Legislature by special act-' to
vest in the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund title to certain
submerged lands in the Indian River, St. Lucie County, that previously
had been partially filled and converted to gainful use by the riparian
owner. The owner sought to enjoin the trustees from asserting title
to the lands and from attempting to dispose of lands already filled.
The lower court enjoined the trustees and declared the special act unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, in affirming, observed that appellee's bulkheading and filling operations had legal sanction under
the 1921 act, that the conversion stopped short of the edge of the
channel, and that full space was left for the requirements of commerce and navigation as provided by the act.
Though title to lands filled pursuant to the Riparian Act of 1921
becomes absolute and is not subject to subsequent divestment, the
riparian owner by failure to fill or improve may, under some circum(1953).
2SHolland v. Ft. Pierce Financing 8&Constr. Co., 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76 (1946).
2Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 283 Fed. 150 (D.C. Cir. 1922);
Holland v. Fort Pierce Financing & Constr. Co., supra note 28; Trumbull v. McIntosh, 103 Fla. 708, 138 So. 34 (1931).
30157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76 (1946).
31Fla. Spec. Acts 1941, c. 21546.
27FLA. STAT. §271.01
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stances, be deprived of all title and interest in adjacent submerged
32
lands.
In a recent case, Duval Engineering & Contracting Co. v. Sales,33
the Supreme Court held that the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund could withdraw the provisional legislative grant and sell
a riparian owner's frontal submerged lands if the owner had not
performed the condition of the grant of the 1921 act by filling in and
improving them. The plaintiffs were fee simple owners of lands
abutting on the St. Johns River in the City of Jacksonville. The
Florida State Improvement Commission, acting for the use and
benefit of the State Road Department, acquired from the Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Fund a perpetual easement in submerged lands adjacent to plaintiffs' upland property, preparatory to
the construction of a bridge. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction
of the bridge and to require defendants to institute condemnation
proceedings before making use of the submerged property. The trial
court held that the plaintiffs, as owners of the riparian rights appurtenant to their land, were entitled to compensation on the theory of
a vested interest under the 1921 act. The Supreme Court, however,
held that submerged lands are subject to reversion to the state at any
time before the owner has complied with the improvement provision
of the grant under the 1921 act. The Court also held that, although
appellees' common law right of ingress and egress and the right to
fish and bathe in the waters of the river might have been slightly impaired by off-shore filling operations, these rights were not sufficiently
injured to warrant a right to compensation. Damnum absque injuria
seems to have been regarded with favor in the ruling.
Hence he who hesitates to bulkhead and fill toward the channel
may lose his legislative permit at any time the state decides to devote
the off-shore shallows to some public use, leaving the upland owner
with only his ancient rights of access, view, and use.
Applicability to Islands. A discussion of the Riparian Rights Act
of 1921 and its effects on rights attendant to ownership of riparian
uplands would not be complete without an inquiry into the applicability of the act to certain islands, title to which is vested by statute
in the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. 34 The question
32Duval Engineering & Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1954); Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 145 Fla. 389, 199 So. 361 (1940).
3377 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1954). But cf. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So.2d 743 (1955).
34FLA. STAT. §§253.06-.07, 253.12 (1953).
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presented is whether the owner of an island in a navigable river or
bay may claim the benefits conferred by the Butler Bill upon mainland riparian owners who bulkhead and fill to the edge of the channel.
It is readily concluded that to allow an island owner to expand his
land area channelward through bottoms and waters "lying in front"
of the island presents a problem quite different from that raised by
permitting a mainland riparian owner to extend and fill in his water
front channelward. This difference is of particular importance when
considered in light of the topographical characteristics and contours
of the shallow bay and harbor areas of this state.
The question was directly presented to the 11th Judicial Circuit in
1948 when the owner of Burlingame Island, a twenty-acre spoil-filled
island lying off the mouth of the Miami River near the downtown
business section of Miami, instituted an action against the municipality
and the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund to quiet title to
the island as it then existed behind bulkhead. The plaintiff also
requested a declaratory decree establishing his right to extend the
island boundaries toward the Miami River channel on the north
and the East Coast Waterway channel on the east, involving an anticipated appropriation of fifty-five acres of bay bottom owned by
the trustees. It was asserted that a proper construction of the Butler
Bill accorded this right to the owners of islands acquired from the
state in the same manner that it was accorded to mainland riparian
owners. It was admitted that the island abutted lengthwise along a
navigable channel, but it was contended that the owner nevertheless
had a right under the statute to fill in other directions to the edges
of other channels.
The trustees and the City of Miami countered by questioning
the plaintiff's title to fifteen of the twenty acres then behind bulkhead
and vigorously denied his right, under the Butler Bill, to appropriate
other state-owned bottoms. The lower court granted a decree quieting
title to the twenty-acre area but declined to rule on the fifty-five-acre
issue on the premise that the ruling would be premature. On defendants' appeal to the Supreme Court it was first held, by a division
opinion rendered in January 1954 and as yet unpublished, that the
plaintiff below had title to the twenty-acre bulkheaded area and that
he was entitled under the Butler Bill to a declaratory decree authorizing the bulkheading and filling in of his island to the two channels,
subject only to approval of the United States Government on points
of navigation and commerce.
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The Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund filed a petition
for rehearing and, because of the importance to the public of the
question involved and the effect of the ultimate decision upon the
general welfare, requested by motion an opportunity to reargue
de novo before the full Court. The motion was granted: and, following lengthy reargument before the Court en banc, the original
opinion was withdrawn by a four-to-three decision, as yet unreported? 5
and the question answered as follows:
"While it may well be that the Legislature intended the Riparian Rights Acts to extend to islands such as those with which
we are concerned in the City of Tampa case, supra, it is our
opinion that the grant made to owners of land to the low water
mark in the 1856 Act, and extended to owners of land to the
highwater mark by the so-called 'Butler Bill,' Chapter 8537,
Acts of 1921 (now appearing as Chapter 271, Laws of Florida
1953), should be strictly limited to islands of that type and
character. It should not be extended to 'islands, sand bars and
shallow banks,' the title to which was vested in the Trustees by
the Tidelands Acts, supra, for the reasons hereinafter stated.
"No authority need be cited for the proposition that a grant
in derogation of sovereignty must be strictly construed in favor
of the sovereign. And since the grant made by the Butler Bill,
as construed by this court, appears to have gone far beyond the
original intention of the 1856 Riparian Rights Act-which
was limited to filling in and bulkheading as an aid to commerce
and navigation only - it is even more important that the grant
therein made should not be extended beyond its terms. Despite
the language of the Butler Bill that the grant therein made
was 'subject to any inalienable trust under which the state
holds all submerged lands and water privileges within its
boundaries,' this court knows, since everyone knows it, that the
Butler Bill has operated to divest the state of its sovereign lands
just as effectively as though a grant thereof without such limitation had been made to a riparian owner. And it would in
our opinion, do violence to the legislative intent to construe
the Riparian Rights Acts of 1856 and 1921 as applicable to the
'islands, sand bars and shallow banks,' the title to which was
vested by the Legislature in the Trustees for the purpose of
sale ......
35Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, No. 24501, Jan. 7, 1955.
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A petition for rehearing was filed to the second opinion during the
early part of 1955, but it has not yet been disposed of by the Court.36
Thus the effect of the "fill in" act on an owner of a bay or river
island is as yet undetermined, with the urges of common sense and
historical precedent undoubtedly supporting the interpretation
3
adopted in the second opinion. 7
c. Special Laws
Practitioners and students of law should be mindful of the fact
that private and public rights in certain bodies of water and lands
riparian thereto in particular counties and sections of the state are
regulated by innumerable special acts, population acts, and local laws.
It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into these local or
restricted rules of law that exist throughout Florida. Suffice it to say
that these hand-to-find acts should be searched out and examined for
possible variances or departures from general law in any given riparian
situation.
In Dade, Palm Beach, and Monroe counties, for instance, the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund have the right to control
and sell islands, sand bars, and shallow banks only if certain characteristics, set forth in sections 253.06 and 253.07 of Florida Statutes
1953, are present. It is to be noted, however, that a 1955 general act
contains a "sleeper" repeal of these acts. 38 The legal efficacy of the
1955 act seems open to serious doubt in view of its apparent violation
39
of the subject and title clause of the Florida Constitution. The title4o
and first section of the act deal exclusively with ratification and validation of certain previous conveyances of the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund, whereas the second section interjects an unnoticed
amendment wholly alien to the tide. A third and concluding section
repeals the six separate sections of existing law applicable to the three
36The Supreme Court has ordered reargument on all issues in this case on Jan.
10, 1956.
37Candor suggests that the possibility of a slight personal prejudice born of
professional advocacy should here be confessed, since the writer has been privileged
to serve with the Attorney General of Florida in representing the interests of the
state in the trial and appeal of this case.
3sFla. Laws 1955, c. 29763, §3.
39FLA. CONsr. art. III, §16.

40"An Act to provide that certain conveyances of lands by the trustees of the
internal improvement fund are ratified by the enactment of section 253.121, Florida
Statutes."
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counties above named. The second and third sections are not even
remotely related to the subject of validation of previous conveyances.
SEAS AND BEcHxs

Beaches
"There is probably no custom more universal, more natural
or more ancient, on the sea-coasts, not only of the United States,
but of the world, than that of bathing in the salt waters of the
ocean and the enjoyment of the wholesome recreation incident
41
thereto."
The sun-blessed beaches of Florida are among the finest in the
world; they are the natural playgrounds of the citizens of Florida and
of thousands of tourists who visit the state each year. Their perpetual
preservation for public use is essential to the public welfare and the
continued growth and prosperity of the state. Necessarily, therefore,
the rights of riparian owners must be strictly regulated in the public
interest, and attempts to trespass below the high-water mark by the
appropriation of any portion of the public foreshore for private purposes should be vigilantly restrained.
Recognizing the need of preserving the beaches for public use,
the Florida Legislature has not extended to riparian owners on the
ocean or gulf the right to bulkhead and fill or otherwise appropriate
lands below the high-water mark. The Butler Bill applies only to the
riparian shores of navigable streams, bays, and harbors.
In the absence of legislative authorization, any intrusion by the
owner of the upland upon the shore below the ordinary high-water
42
mark is unlawful and is treated as a purpresture or a nuisance.
Until 1949, however, there was no reported instance in Florida of legal
action on the part of the state or other public authority to enjoin or
suppress a private appropriation of the foreshore.
43
In February 1949 an action was filed in the l1th Judicial Circuit
by the Dade County Solicitor to abate and remove as a nuisance a
completed purpresture on the shore of the famous "hotel row" in
4lWhite v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 58, 190 So. 446, 448 (1939).
42Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918); ANGELL, TIDEWATERs c. 7 (2d ed. 1847).
43State ex rel. Taylor v. Simberg, State ex rel. Marsh v. Simberg, 2 Fla. Supp.
178 (1952), 4 Fla. Supp. 85 (1953).
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Miami Beach. The City of Miami Beach, one of the defendants, had
enacted certain ordinances in 1948 providing for the establishment
of a "harbor line" in the Atlantic Ocean. A harbor line was subsequently set by the engineering office of the city, without regard for
the rights of the public to the use of the beach or foreshore for bathing,
recreation, fishing, boating, or navigation. This line was to be used
only as a "bulkhead line" for the purpose of marking the eastern or
oceanward point to which hotel owners would be permitted by the
city to extend their proprietary uses.
The line fixed by the city extended on the foreshore of Miami
Beach north and south between high and low water marks, and
certain hotel owners were granted permits to fill in the shore and
erect structures to this line. The structures erected were permanent
in nature and resulted in the exclusion of the public from considerable portions of the beach in front of the hotels.
The plaintiffs sought, in addition to relief from nuisance, a declaratory decree to determine whether the city had authority to issue
permits for structures extending over the foreshore and, if not, to
enjoin the city from issuing such permits in the future. Circuit Judge
Charles A. Carroll entered an order severing the suit for trial purposes into two causes, one against the infringing landowners and
the other against the City of Miami Beach.
The city took the position that the establishment of a harbor line
was for the purpose of allowing riparian owners to reclaim lands
that had been washed away by the 1926 hurricane and later storms.
On this point the court found that there had been a recession of the
beach line to some extent over the past twenty or thirty years and
that hurricane seas had played some part in the loss of upland soil.
The court held, however, that the instances in which the city had
permitted upland hotel owners to take over the foreshore were not
predicated on any factual findings of a visible loss by avulsion as
distinguished from erosion.
The court concluded that the ocean foreshore or beach is held
by the state in trust for the public for purposes of navigation, fishing,
and bathing, and that any attempt on the part of the city to authorize
appropriation thereof by a riparian owner should be invalidated.
The city was permanently enjoined from granting permits or
other authorizations for the construction of seawalls, bulkheads, fills,
or other structures on the foreshore of the Atlantic Ocean within
municipal limits. The court further ordered, however, that its in-
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junction should not apply to the construction of groynes or jetties
built at right angles to the beach for the purpose of preserving the
existing beach, entrapping sand, and improving the beach in the
public interests, but that permits should not authorize the erection
of fences or walls across the foreshore or out into the ocean in such
manner as to obstruct or prevent public passage and use of the
foreshore.
The issue of structure removal incident to nuisance abatement
is yet to be decided, but it seems fairly safe to predict that defenses of
estoppel by acquiescence and laches, strengthened by the illusive
"hardship" doctrine, will provide the riparian defendants with a
protective shield of some quality in the final stage of their litigation.
The idealist, however, may well wonder why a fait accompli violation
of public property rights should find sanctuary in any legal doctrine
when, except for the speed and promptness of the wrongful act, the
law would have condemned and enjoined the trespass. In this regard,
a "fast grabber" is apparently given a reward that might be denied
the more deliberate taker. A more vigilant enforcement of public
laws and rights would doubtless have prevented these grave losses of
valuable public properties.
The High Seas
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. California,44 the famous "Tidelands" case, and its later decisions
46
4
in United States v. Louisiana 5 and United States v. Texas, commonly known as the Submerged Lands Cases, created doubts as to
Florida's right to regulate the use of the inshore waters of the Gulf
of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean and to control the adjacent submerged lands. These doubts, however, now appear to have been
resolved in favor of the state with the passage by Congress of the
1953 Submerged Lands Act. 47 By this act Congress established a distance of three geographical miles from the coast line of each state as
the general offshore limit of the state's rights to submerged lands. It
was provided in addition that if the state's boundary at the time of
entrance into the Union, or as approved by Congress prior to the
passage of the act, extended beyond this distance the previously
established distance would be recognized. Section 2 (b) placed a
44332 U.S.
45339 U.S.
46339 U.S.
4767 STAT.

19 (1947).
699 (1950).
707 (1950).
29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §3101.
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definite limit of three geographical miles from the coast line for states
bordering the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and three marine leagues,
or nine geographical miles, for states bordering the Gulf of Mexico.
Florida's seaward boundaries, therefore, are three geographical miles
on the Atlantic Ocean and nine geographical miles on the Gulf of
Mexico.
NONNAVIGABLE WATERS

Determinationof Ownership
If a lake, pond, or other body of water is nonnavigable in fact,
it is generally conceded in Florida that the bed is subject to private
ownership.48 In fact, the state itself has conveyed to private owners
millions of acres of land, much of which consists of lakes and ponds,
49
without reservation of title to the beds.
By statute all beds and bottoms under navigable waters are declared to be the property of the state. 50 This result was obtained by
virtue of sovereignty upon admission to statehood long before statutory dedaration.r1 Since beds under nonnavigable waters were ignored
in the statutory declaration of state ownership, it is reasonable to
presume that the public policy of the state intends that they shall
be subject to private ownership.
In Poundsv. Darling52 the Florida Supreme Court, in invalidating
a city ordinance prohibiting bathing in a nonnavigable lake in the
City of Orlando, observed quite pointedly: "... the lake is owned by
the persons whose lots border upon it.... Nor is there any doubt as
a matter of law that nonnavigable bodies of water may be the subject of private ownership." In a case decided only last year, 53 the
Florida Supreme Court met the question more directly by holding
that small lakes are susceptible of private ownership in Florida.54
4,Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927); Clement v. Watson, 63
Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912); Pounds v. Darling, 75 Fla. 125, 77 So. 666 (1918).
49Whitfield, Politicaland Legal History of Florida, 1 FLA. STAT. ANN. cxii (1953).
5OFA. STAT. §370.03 (1953).
5
'Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1819); see State ex rel. Ellis v.
Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353, 355 (1908).
5275 Fla. 125, 135, 77 So. 666, 669 (1918).
53Crutchfield v. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1954).
54Id. at 329: 'it is settled by the decisions of this Court that small lakes are
susceptible of private ownership in Florida.... In the instant case the court below
found, and the evidence sustained the finding, that Basket Lake was a non-
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It is to be presumed, of course, that the rule of private ownership
applied to a single owner of an over-all lake area will likewise be applicable when more than one person owns the lands riparian to a
nonnavigable lake or river.
Whether an owner of land riparian to nonnavigable waters owns
the underlying bed to the center of the lake or other body in question
will depend, as in any other title question, upon whether the deeds in
his chain of title are sufficient to convey the lands. When no other
intent is ascertainable from the deed, it is generally presumed that
the intention was to convey title to the center of the submerged land. 53
Such was the holding of the lower court in a Florida case, Broward v.
Mabry," although direct review was obviated by the finding of the
Supreme Court that the lake was navigable and that the bed underlying the waters therefore belonged to the state by virtue of sovereignty.
Use
Assuming private ownership of the bed to the center of the submerged area, the question arises whether each owner is restricted to
the use of the water over his fee or is allowed to use the entire body
for fishing, boating, and bathing in common with other shore proprietors.
The common law rule makes no distinction between land and
water so far as absolute dominion and control are concerned;- it
restricts each owner to the use of the water overlying his fee. 58 The
civil law rule allows the owner of a portion of the bed to make a
reasonable use of the surface of the entire lake, as long as he does
navigable lake and that it, and all the land surrounding it was owned by the
plaintiff. It is plain, therefore, that the defendants could not
to lay their pipes along the strips and to the lake shore and to
the lake for large-scale irrigation because of any riparian rights
it being well settled that riparian rights subsist only for riparian
those who do not own riparian land cannot claim such rights."

claim any right
take water from
vested in them;
owners and that

55The United States has held that local law determines the extent of a grant
by United States patent of property abutting on nonnavigable waters. Marshall
Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460 (1913); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1903);
Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406 (1891). This statement has since been limited to an

assumption that the United States has assented to local construction of the patent
provided it exhibits no conflicting intent. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1

(1935); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
5658 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
57Lamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn. 317, 90 N.W. 578 (1902).
5sSmoulter v. Boyd, 209 Pa. 146, 58 Atl. 144 (1904).
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not unduly interfere with the rights of other proprietors. 59 Decisions
of the various states are as diverse as they are numerous. 60 The paucity
of Florida decisions on the subject led one writer to remark that in
searching for the Florida rule "the ironic spectre of 30,000 lakes and
no case law arises."'61 Such is indeed the case, and whether Florida
will ultimately follow the restrictive common law use rule or adopt
the more practicable rule of the civil law remains an open question.
It is submitted that, since Florida is a great tourist state of world
fame for boating, fishing, and yachting, the civil law "reasonable use"
rule would better serve the interests of the state, notwithstanding the
fact that as a common law state the common law rule ordinarily
would be accepted as controlling. Under the latter rule, however,
boaters, skiers, fishermen, and swimmers would be permitted to enjoy
only that portion of the lake waters defined by an extension of their
riparial property lines, or those of their host for the occasion, to the
center of the lake.
It is logical to assume that a state that steadfastly preserves, as
a public trust, the title to the beds of navigable lakes for the use and
enjoyment of the public would look with much more favor upon
the use-in-common rule of the civil law when the nonnavigable use
question is presented for determination. Indeed, had there existed
in old England such things as an abundance of lakes, fast motorboats,
and skiers, the common law rule might have been vastly different.
It should be mentioned that in water consumption cases the Florida
Supreme Court, in applying the rules of equal right and reasonable use
to the taking of waters from lakes by riparian owners, may have furnished indications that it will apply the same doctrines to recreational
uses of the surface of such water bodies.62
Possibility of Divestment
Through the entire question of private ownership of lands under
waters assumed to be nonnavigable shines the warning light of
Broward v. Mabiy - a warning that a court decree may at any time
59Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 590 (1891) (dictum).
60E.g., Mix v. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 298 N.Y. Supp. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Akron
Canal & Hydraulic Co. v. Fontaine, 75 Ohio App. 93, 50 N.E.2d 897 (1943);
Smoulter v. Boyd, 209 Pa. 146, 58 At. 144 (1904); Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett,
88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); see Note, 5 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 166, 176 (1952).
BiNote, 5 U. FL.A. L. R-v. 166, 178 (1952).
62Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1950); Tampa Waterworks Co. v.
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liquidate assumed private ownership of any shallow lake or river
bottom by holding such waters to be navigable. This holding would
automatically vest title in the state under the sovereignty premise.
In this day of shallow draft skiffs and skis and state consciousness
of the vast mineral potential of its subaqueous soil, it would be well
for riparian owners of shallow lakes and rivers of whatever size, depth,
or use to prenez garde lest their aqueous bodies suddenly become
fitted with the thorn-studded crown of navigability and be thereby
transmuted to state ownership sans compensation or thanks.
Legislation enumerating the navigable streams and lakes of the
state would probably settle the matter; this has been resorted to elsewhere.- 3 Application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to such
a statute would tend to operate as a title ratification in the private
owners of lands underlying unenumerated bodies of water, absent
a federal question.
The Legislature in a rather obscure and untested 1953 act 6" may
have relieved the situation by incorporating definitions of navigable
waters and riparian rights into a blend of tax assessment matters.
Granting constitutional effectiveness of the act and application thereof beyond the tax theme, it would seem that the door has been dosed
to future judicial labors on the question of navigability of lakes and
ponds in certain instances. 5

Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896).
8SCAL. HARBORS & NAVIGATION CODE §§101-106 (1937).
64FLA. STAT. § 192.61 (1953).
65FLA. STAT. §192.61 (2) (1953) provides: "Navigable waters in this state shall
not be held to extend to any permanent or transient waters in the form of so-called
lakes, ponds, swamps or overflowed lands, lying over and upon areas which have
heretofore been conveyed to private individuals by the United States of America
or by the State of Florida without reservation of public rights in and to said

waters."
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